In this note we show that the results developed in Singh and Vives (1984) are sensitive to the duopoly assumption (Rand 15,[546][547][548][549][550][551][552][553][554]. If there are more than two firms, prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition. This will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements. If goods are substitutes, high-quality firms may earn higher profits under price competition than under quantity competition. Hence, it is not evident which kind of competition is more efficient.
Introduction
In a classic contribution to oligopoly theory Singh and Vives (1984) discuss the nature of competition in Bertrand and Cournot markets using the duopoly framework developed in Dixit (1979) . The conclusions are strong and clear-cut. Cournot competition always yields higher prices and lower welfare compared to Bertrand competition. When goods are substitutes, firm profits are higher under Cournot competition while if goods are complements Bertrand competition is more profitable.
Considering the theoretical and practical importance of these results it seems important to test their robustness with respect to alternative market structures. We therefore extend the Dixit (1979) model to allow for an arbitrary number of firms. The discussion is limited to prices and profit levels since the welfare issue becomes too complex in a general setting.
For simplicity, we allow only for two dimensions of firm heterogeneity, vertical product differentiation and substitutability. Moreover, it is assumed that the marginal cost of production 1 is equal across firms.
The Dixit (1979) model generalizes nicely despite the asymmetry that stems from vertical product differentiation. The linear demand structure ensures that firm demand depends only on the average quality of the competitors products while it is unaffected by changes in the exact distribution of product qualities across firms.
The duopoly results do not to generalize to the n-firm setting if quality differences are large. When goods are complements (and quality differences large) low-quality firms will charge prices that are higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. If goods are substitutes, high-quality firms may earn higher profits under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.
The Model
The utility function in Singh and Vives (1984) is of the following type
For simplicity let us assume that $ = $ = 1. Thus, utility is quadratic in the consumption of q- It is straightforward to generalize the utility function to allow for n firms producing one product variety each.
Consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint 3p q + I # m, where m i i denotes income and the price of the composite good is normalized to one. The first-order condition determining the optimal consumption of good k is
Cournot Competition
Firm k's inverse demand function can be solved for directly from expression 1.
Firms set quantities to maximize profits, B , taking the other firms' quantities as given. If costs k are normalized to zero, firm k's reaction function equals
Summing over all firms and noting that we can solve for demand and price in equilibrium where superscript C indicates Cournot equilibrium. Thus, firm k's equilibrium price and quantity depend on the average quality if its competitors products but are independent of the exact distribution of product qualities across firms.
Bertrand Competition
Summing over all firms, expression 1 can be written Expressions 1, 2 and 3 then yield firm k's demand function.
Profit maximization (and zero costs) then implies the following reaction function Summing this over all firms and using expressions 2 and 5 then yields the equilibrium prices and quantities for firm k where B denotes Bertrand equilibrium. Again, firm k's equilibrium price and quantity depend on the average quality if its competitors products but are independent of the exact distribution.
Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria
The first proposition in Singh and Vives (1984) deals with the welfare implications of price and quantity competition. Cournot prices are found to be higher than Bertrand prices regardless of whether goods are complements or substitutes. This means that welfare is always higher under price competition. Moreover, Cournot profits are shown to be higher than Bertrand profits when goods are substitutes. If goods are complements, the opposite relation holds.
If we take the difference between the Cournot price and the Bertrand price of the generalized model we arrive at the following condition.
Hence, unless n = 2, the price differential consists of a positive and a negative term. The sign will
be determined by the number of firms, the degree of horizonal differentiation and the quality distribution between firm k and its competitors.
Proposition 1: Assume that n > 2. i) When goods are substitutes, p > p . Hence, welfare is C B k k unambiguously higher when firms compete in prices. ii) When goods are complements, and quality differences are large, p < p for low-quality firms.
C B k k
Proof: First consider the case when goods are substitutes. Let z be the ratio between the average k quality offered by the rival firms, 3" /(n-1), and the quality offered by firm k, " . If z <1 firm k j k k produces a better product than the average rival and vice versa. Unless z is small enough, firm k k will be driven out of the market in equilibrium. Specifically, under Bertrand competition
while the corresponding condition under Cournot competition is
The second-order condition for an interior solution under Bertrand competition is c > 1/(1-n). This ensures that z < z . Hence, it is not meaningful to talk about an n-firm market
The price differential is positive unless z is large. Specifically, p -p > 0 unless
It is straightforward to verify that there exists no z that can satisfy the latter and the former 
2(n 2 &3n%2) . 6 differential. It can be checked that z* increases monotonically in (. Moreover, z* > 0 when k k ( = 1/(1-n) and z* approaches +4 as ( approaches zero from below. Hence, for every ( in the k interval [1/(1-n), 0] there exists a threshold value z* such that z > z* implies that p < p .
Finally, z* decreases in n and approaches z* = 1 as n approaches infinity. Hence, only firms k k producing qualities below average will charge higher prices under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. ~ A switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition will reduce the prices of high-quality products and increase equilibrium demand. If goods are complements, this will increase the demand for low-quality products which, in turn, may enable low-quality producers to raise their prices. always smaller than one.~ When quality differences are large, high-quality firms become insulated from competition from
